Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
Cancio L. C., 5d . PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER Many of us have speculated that a much large number of seriously burned survivors would have emerged from the twin towers had they not collapsed. Thus, although preparation for a nuclear attack or a small pox outbreak are important tasks, a more pressing homeland security mission is preparation for the more likely scenario of another disaster involving conventional explosives and large numbers of burn and trauma casualties. Numerous reports have demonstrated the value of local, regional, and national disaster plans, while documenting the price paid for ineffective planning and execution. 3 In this issue of the Journal, Yurt et al describe pioneering efforts by a New York City Task Force to establish a regional burn disaster plan to take care of a situation in which the number of burn patients (up to 400) exceeds local resources, ie, the surge capacity of 105 burn beds estimated for the city. 4 This plan envisions a tiered response, involving burn centers, trauma centers, and nontrauma hospitals. Patients would be triaged to one of these three types of hospital based on predicted mortality (considering age and burn size). Command and control would be provided by a Central Burn Triage Coordination Team. Burn-specific supplies and training for the nonburn hospitals are planned.
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This work is critically important, and considerable work remains to be done. As the authors point out, financial support is needed; communications and informationtechnology issues must be resolved; and individual education is required. But the sine qua non for the success of any disaster plan is rigorous, realistic training. Such training requires an extraordinary level of commitment on the part of all involved. In view of this, I would challenge all of us to reassess how seriously we take disaster training. Having observed an Israeli hospital respond to a no-notice chemical attack drill, I agree with Dr. Hirshberg: "Anyone who has seen an Israeli hospital in action during an MCI (multiple casualty incident) cannot fail to notice the commitment of the entire hospital staff. . . Every hospital employee, from the chief of staff to the cashier in the outpatient clinics, has a predefined role in the emergency plan and regularly participates in disaster drills." 5 Furthermore, disaster training should be designed not only to practice the plan, but also to uncover its weaknesses by overwhelming the system. How will we communicate if existing methods fail? Who will make decisions if the Central Burn Triage Coordination Team can't be reached? What do we do if hospitals are contaminated by unanticipated chemical agents? What can we do to take providers past the first few hours taught by ABLS? How can we utilize national resources most effectively-should we bring providers here, or send patients elsewhere?
As recognized by LTG Honoré in the quote about Hurricane Katrina, there will always be a gap between the plan and its execution. Relentless training and a strong foundation of institutional and individual support, however, can help bridge this gap. We look forward to New York's continued efforts.
